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DIRECTORATE OF
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VIETNAM: Supplementary guidance has been sent to Communist commands in South Vietnam on the state of negotiations and local preparations for an expected cease-fire.

The latest COSVN guidelines

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25X1 [redacted] advise cadre that a cease-fire is being negotiated essentially along the lines of the nine-point agreement broadcast by Hanoi on 26 October. As in previous instructions, the Communist headquarters says that some minor modifications can be expected but that the major points will remain unchanged. COSVN insists that Hanoi will not agree to a general withdrawal of North Vietnamese troops and that, while the functions of the tripartite council may be modified somewhat, at a minimum "it must be established to oversee the implementation of the cease-fire agreement and determine the procedures for holding free elections."

In a previous directive disseminated in mid-November, COSVN advised its commands that an agreement could not be expected before Christmas and possibly not until President Nixon's inauguration. The latest guidelines are less explicit on the timing and simply state that "the negotiations may continue for some time." They also warn local commands that a government counteroffensive can be expected sometime during the dry season to recapture lost areas in the northern provinces and in the delta. Currently, however, COSVN maintains that government military preparations are mainly defensive "in anticipation of our activities to expand our territory at the time a cease-fire is readied."

25X1 [redacted] COSVN reiterates that the party's policies remain unchanged and that local commands should continue their efforts to expand territory and strengthen their numbers. In addition, the document warns against continuing "signs of deviation" among party cadre caused "partly because our revolution has been going on for so long a time and is so demanding that they feel a strong desire for peace."

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This latest document appears to contain few modifications of earlier COSVN directives, although it does suggest that the Communists may not be as optimistic about an early cease-fire as they once were. The latest instructions also seem intended to remind cadre to continue local preparations for some form of military action between an announcement of a cease-fire and its implementation.

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*CHINA-LAOS: Peking evidently is undertaking a major reorganization or redeployment of its forces in northwest Laos as dry season road construction begins.

Aerial photography of mid-November shows that some 125 of the 350 to 400 AAA guns previously deployed along the road system have been removed. Most of the reduction has taken place in the Muong Houn - Pak Beng area where road construction is now under way.


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Whether the AAA units have been withdrawn to China or are being redeployed within Laos cannot as yet be determined. The scope of activity reflected in [redacted] photography suggests that a reduction of AAA forces is taking place.

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
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The Chinese have apparently begun construction along Route 3 in the Nam Tha area and are continuing to improve the existing road network. The two Chinese infantry regiments that came into Laos early this year remain deployed along the road system and in the areas of new construction.

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*Because of the shortage of time for preparation of this item, the analytic interpretation presented here has been produced by the Central Intelligence Agency without the participation of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State.

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GREECE: Prime Minister Papadopoulos, increasingly boxed in by military critics, is groping for new ideas.

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[REDACTED] He is chary of any scheme that would jeopardize his own supremacy, however, and he knows that any move toward liberalization would meet with strenuous objections from important military officers.

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The government's interest in sharply increasing education and social welfare services next year is probably closely related to these basic political concerns.

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[REDACTED] Budget figures already released indicate increases of 41 percent in the outlay for education and 17 percent for welfare. Papadopoulos presumably hopes to strengthen his standing with the people and thereby gain a freer hand with his military colleagues.

The prime minister will find it difficult to go much beyond such relatively tame measures without running into trouble from the military. A number of important officers are dissatisfied with the way things are going, but divided on what to do about it.

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[REDACTED] Prospects for a coup from such a quarter do not seem good, but rumblings of this kind nonetheless worry Papadopoulos and make him even more cautious about relinquishing any authority.

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NOTES

USSR - NORTH VIETNAM: The Soviet Union has shipped to a Chinese port Komar missile patrol boats apparently destined for North Vietnam. [REDACTED]

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
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[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] The freighters departed Vladivostok on 18 November and are now in Chan-chiang, one of the Chinese ports used for transshipping materiel to North Vietnam. China has been the major supplier of naval craft to North Vietnam, but the USSR has supplied some gunboats. North Vietnam has no Komar boats, which carry two antiship cruise missiles with a 12-15-mile range. [REDACTED]

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Komar Class Guided Missile Patrol Boat



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
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CUBA-USSR: A Soviet E-II class nuclear-powered, cruise missile submarine entered Cienfuegos harbor on 3 December. The E-II deployed from its base in the Soviet Northern Fleet in late October. Submarines of this class have previously called at Cuban ports twice--first in 1970 and then again in 1971. Soviet warships in Cuban waters now include a cruiser, a destroyer, an F class diesel-powered torpedo attack submarine, and the E-II. [REDACTED]

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
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